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Historical Background
For a long time, Thailand and Japan have had a close relationship; Thai-Japan economic relations
have been maintained through the transfer of technology in trade, direct investment, and
economic cooperation.
Presently, many corporations from around the world are active in Thailand. Among these,
Japanese corporations are the most numerous. Technological contributions have been made
through these channels of economic cooperation, and one can say that Thai culture has been able
to achieve its present level of development in part due to Japanese technological cooperation.
Japanese businesses, such as electrical and electronic parts manufacturing companies, due to the
high yen rate have worked in cooperation with Thai businesses. (Most of this cooperation is in the
form of joint venture corporations)
In Thailand, as in many developing countries, foreign direct investment (FDI) provides one of the
most dynamic stimulants to economic development. During the Economic boom, Thailand has
been enjoying relative high growth with rates registered at 10-12% per annum. The high growth
rates were attributed to the high-flying performance of the industrial sectors, which were boosted
by high inflow of capital funds from foreign countries, especially FDI in the manufacturing
sector.
Japanese direct investment is one of the most important factors, which boosts the Thai economy.
Its structure has change over time. Firstly, in the 1970s, most of the Japanese firms invested in
labor-intensive industries. Then, after the Plaza Accord, they predominately invested in the
export-oriented industries and in industries producing capital and intermediate goods. After the
Plaza Accord in 1985, the net FDI inflow increased substantially due to the rapid appreciation of
the Japanese yen. At present, most of the Japanese direct investment in Thailand is in supporting
industries.
The importance of Japanese direct investments in Thailand has risen dramatically. We can divide
the inflow of Japanese direct investment into 3 waves. The fIrst wave of Japanese investment into
Thailand began in the 1970s and, as mentioned earlier, concentrated on the labor-intensive
industries. The significant motivations for coming to Thailand are as follows. The first one is that
rapidly rising domestic wages and land costs in Japan led to the loss of comparative advantage.
The second one is that Japanese investors desired to secure market share in Asian countries,
which were threatened by measures to protect domestic import substituting industries from
foreign competition.
The second wave in the late 1980s touched off a flood of investment in the export-oriented
industries. The expansions of Japanese direct investment resulted from both push and pull factors.
The most important push factor has been the rapid appreciation of the value of the yen after the
Plaza Accord. The high economic growth, political stability and improvement of infrastructures in
Thailand are major pull factors.
The third wave began in mid-1993. At that time, the Japanese yen has been appreciated again so
as to avoid the problem of the high price of imported parts and components from Japan. Local
Thai manufacturers induced Japanese firms to establish their production bases directly in
Thailand. The Japanese companies coming to Thailand are for the most part small and medium-
sized companies, mainly in supporting industries that supply parts and components to
manufacturers already based in Thailand, such as the automobile industry.
Thailand has undergone significant economic transformation over the past two decades. In the
middle and late 1980s, a remarkable combination of domestic and international phenomena came
together to "make a miracle" in Thailand.
The initiation of the first five-year National Economic and Social Development Plan in 1961
marked the new era of foreign direct investment. With the introduction of the export promotion
strategy in the early 1980s, FDI inflows started to recover after the sluggish growth period during
the second half of the 1970s. Prior to 1988, FDI inflows hardly exceeded 4% of gross domestic
investment, although they accounted for higher shares of private business investment. The sharp
increase in FDI inflows, 212.1 % in 1988, was greatly attributed to the industrial relocation
strategy adopted by Japan and The Newly Industrialized Economies (NIBs), such as Taiwan,
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Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea. This huge influx of FDI since 1988 has resulted mainly from
the appreciating currencies of Japan and NIBs, escalating labor costs in these countries, and
Thailand's ability to maintain its comparative advantages as an export base.
Given the global economic changes in the mid-1980s, Japanese firms adopted a new approach to
business by relocating their manufacturing facilities to lower-cost locations in order to maintain
their international competitiveness. Thailand has been one of the preferred investment locations.
The traditionally dominant role of the United States has thus been eroded over the past 6 years. In
1988, FDI from Japan rose by 346.8% while that from the U.S. increased by 75.4%. The FDI
stock of Japan surpassed that of the U.S. for the first time in 1988. The average share of U.S.
investment dropped from 36.1 % in the 1970s to only 11.4% in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Another important characteristic of the distribution pattern of FDI sources is the increasing role of
NIEs since the second half of the 1980s. The share of investment from NIEs sharply increased
from 14.3% and 15.3 % during the 1970s and early 1980s to 33.0% during 1986-91. 1 Much of
FDI from these countries and Japan has been channeled into export-oriented activities. One
reason has been that multinationals have felt more resource-constrained in an increasing
competitive word economy.
Statement of Problem
Under the new global competition and Thailand's present economic disorder, Japanese direct
investments face tough competition in global marketing strategy, given the fluctuation of local
currency system. It is interesting to see how Japanese direct investors adjust their corporate and
business policies, competitive advantages and global management strategies under the turbulence
of Asian economic disorder.
In Thailand, during the 1980s, export promotion policy was heavily emphasized with
considerable success. The domestic industries grew rapidly till the early 1990s when new
problems were discovered. The export promotion policy was effective only for a short period of
time because of the main problems of insufficiency of technology, capital and size of market.
Simple technologies were normally imported with limited financial capital. Once industries grew,
it was found that those industries needed further expansion of market, capital and technologies to
attain their respective of scale.
1 Bank of Thailand. monthly Bulletin July. 1995. p. 9
Recently, the Thai government has set the direction for adjusting industrial structure in reaction to
the economic stagnation caused by the financial crisis. One of the important targets is to
strengthen the supporting industries, as well as upgrading technology and the development of
human resources.
Foreign corporations generally believe that Thai government is acting as laissez-faire toward her
economic and trade development. Moreover, Thai government does not involve in industrial and
trade development as in Japan, it does intervene and accelerate the development. This can be
observed from the National Economic and Social Development Plan, especially from Plan 4 to 8,
and from other government agencies and policies on export promotion, the change in tax system
to Value Added Tax (VAT), and the change in Thai' Baht exchange rate system in 1997.
On the other hand, there are various criticisms of the quality and methods of Japanese corporate
technology transfer. The kind of contributions the Japanese direct investment can make to the
economic development of Thailand. Although, the contributions of Japanese direct investment
will be important for economic activity of Thailand, it would be make some problems in
management conflict among Japanese and Thai corporations.
Some Japanese corporations have come to competition with Thai businesses. However, since
Thailand accepts multinational corporations, this trend creates both minuses and pluses. I will
analyze the positive and negative effects of this expansion by Japanese corporations that will play
a significant role in Thai economy in the future.
In particular, the role of Japanese direct investment is incomparably important for the Thai
economy. I wish to introduce positive modes of Japanese direct investment and relations and
would like to analyze the present situation and investigate the background to the problem and
future prospects. Especially, I would like to pursue research on the ways of doing business, which
creates advantages for Thai economic development.
Objectives of the study
The objectives of this study are as follows.
1. To examine and analyze the international cooperation of Japanese direct investment in
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Thailand and it's role in economic development of Thailand.
2. To provide a comprehensive investment opportunities of the Japanese direct investment in
Thai's manufactory and create the Government strategy toward Japanese direct investment for
the future's markets.
Scope of study
This study is basically dealing with international cooperation in Japanese FDI and its relationship
with economic development of Thailand. Particularly, this study examines the characteristics of
Japanese FDI activities between Japanese multinationals and Thai domestic partners. One reason
has been that the number of Thai-Japanese joint ventures has increased dramatically over the
time.
From the viewpoint of host country and consideration of economic development, it is important to
know the host country's economic factors, which may influence the potential benefits of Japanese
FDI and examine the question of the determinants of Japanese FDI. Why do The Japanese firms
decide to invest in Thailand or not? To what degree can a country's policies influence the amount
of FDI inflow?
In this study, I am going to emphasize on the role of Japanese direct investment in technology
transfer from Japan to Thailand that relate to Thai economic development. This study is done on
one main assumption that the meaning of development and growth refers respectively to the
"economic development" and "economic growth" under the capitalistic ideology. Therefore,
the effect of Japanese direct investment will be judged not only by economic development in
terms of GNP, which I certainly cannot and will not deny its importance. During the past decade,
the contemporary debate topics in Thailand now range' from some topics like the economic
development and environmental deterioration issues and etc. Apart from Recent Thailand'
Economic crisis, the concern that the economic development under capitalistic ideology would
endanger the society in various ways and the concept of nostalgia starts worrying Thai people as
one of the present issues in their live. Nevertheless, though it is important not to ignore such
topics, I would like to limit the scope of this study to the economic development and growth only.
The main reason is to keep the scope of study from becoming too broad and general.
Chapter 1
An Overview of Japanese FDI in Thailand
1.1 Policy Environment
The Thai Economy performed rather well over the last two decades with quite high real GDP.
This growth was encouraged by significant structural changes, particularly the gradual shift in
production and export structure from agricultural to manufacturing products, mainly resulting
from implementing the industrial development strategies since the early 1960s.
The industrial development strategies can be divided into two types: namely the import-
substitution strategy, which induces domestic production so as to replace imports and the export-
oriented strategy, which promotes local production for international markets. These strategies
have been adopted in various aspects of its industrialization policies as can be observed from the
guideline stated in the National Economic and Social Development Plan.2
The government's first attempt to promote industrial investment by utilizing incentive measures
was the Act of the Promotion of Industries enacted in 1954. However, the act was proved
ineffective and was repealed in 1958. In 1959, the Board of Investment (BOI) was established in
order to implement a new Investment Promotion Act which was promulgated in 1960 and
consequently amended in 1962, called Promotion of Industrial Investment Act of 1962. These two
acts were implemented in the period of first and second development plans.
During the first plan (1961-1966), Thai government adopted the import-substitution policies,
which promoted the private investment from local and foreign investors in import-substitution
industries by providing various incentives and protective measures against competing imports and
restricted establishment of new enterprises, which competed with exiting ones. At that time, the
main task of the government was to invest in infrastructure, especially, power and transport.
The import-substitution policies were also implemented in the second plan (1967-1971) in which
government promoted industries, which utilized domestic raw materials and general employment,
encouraged joint-venture between Thai and foreign investors, and would support small-scale and
2 Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), office of the Prime Minister,
1995, p.15
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cottage industries.
During the period of import-substitution policy, the principal means of promoting investment
were the government's development of infrastructure, investment promotion incentives granted by
the BOI, industrial investment credits, both long-term and medium-term loans, provided by the
Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT), and tariff protection against imports provided
by the Ministry of Finance. Industries favored during this period were large scale and capital
intensive.
However, the import-substitution policy worsened trade balance difficulties due to the large
amount of import of intermediate materials and capital goods. Therefore, the importance of export
was rising in order to improve the trade deficit.
As a result, an export-promotion policy was declared in the third plan (1972-1976) and has been
implemented up until now. In 1972, the government enacted a new investment promotion law
(National Executive Council Decree 227), which emphasized the promotion of export activities
and decentralization of investment from the area around Bangkok in order to disperse industries
into the rural areas and to reduce the inequality in income distribution among regions.
Investment promotion law was amended further in 1977, reflecting the government's increased
desire to encourage industrial investment. The power of the BOI was enhanced as the Prime
Minister became its chairman and cabinet ministers were included as members. Moreover, the
BOI was given discretionary power in privileges to promoted projects and in taking action on any
matter, which may be seen as an obstacle to investment.
During the third and fourth plan (1972-1976 and 1977-1981), Thailand faced with the problem of
trade deficit and recession mainly due to the oil crisis. The implementation of export-promotion
policy was ineffective. In the fifth plan (1982-1986), the emphasis on export-promotion policy
became more pronounced since the government declared its plan to restructure certain existing
and new industries so as to increase efficiency, enabling them to become more competitive
C,1feign as well as domestic markets.
In the sixth plan (1987-1991), the government paid much concern on development of industrial
competitiveness and exports. The major policies are to control the quality of products, to improve
market and production efficiency and to provide human resources and technological development.
During this period, The Thai economy grew so rapidly that the storage of basic infrastructure and
skilled labors occurred. In 1991, the Investment Promotion Act was amended again and has been
implemented in the seventh plan.
In the seventh plan (1992-1996), the government emphasizes on maintaining the economic
growth together with developing the human resource skill, technology and basic infrastructure in
order to serve excess demand of investors.
Presently, the two important issues are small and medium-sized industries and decentralization of
industrial location to remote area. Before the Investment Promotion Act of 1991 was
implemented, only the large-scale fIrms had the right to receive the promotion from BOI. But now
the promotions are granted to the small-sized business with total investment at least 1 million
baht.
The policy designed to promote regional diversification of investment has been implemented for
decades. The degree of incentives varies according to location. Since 1973 BOI has granted the
greater promotion privileges to promoted firms located faraway from Bangkok and neighboring
provinces.
The zoning have changed for several times. A major change in BOrs spatial policy occurred in
September 1987. The country was divided into 3 zones: zone 1
Included Bangkok and Samut Prakan; Zone 2 comprised four neighboring provinces and
industrial estates in Zone 1; and Zone 3 included 67 other provinces, which were designated as
Investment Promotion Zones. The BOI further modifIed these 3 zones again in January 1989 and
use them as criteria for granting fiscal incentives up until now.
Presently, Thailand is divided geographically into 3 zones, namely Zone 1, Zone 2 and Zone 3 (
Investment Promotion zone).3 Generally the promoted firms in Zone 1 and 2 receive the
promotion privileges with more condition imposed on the other hand firms in Zone 3 are granted
more privileges.
In general, Thailand adopts a liberal policy towards FDI, with the exception of ownership
restrictions in certain business. Government not only tries to attract more FDI into the economy
but also ensures that the benefits derived from FDI are maximized and costs are minimized.
Therefore, various measures have been introduced to more efficiently handle FDI.
3 Zone 1 includes Bangkok. Samut Prakan. Samut Sakhon. Pathum Thani. Nonta Buri and Nakhone
Pathom. Zone 2 and 3 are the remaining investment promotion zones.
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1.2 Characteristics of Japanese FDI in Thailand
Japanese FDI in Thailand has been diversified in various economic sector. The most important
sector is manufactUring, accounting for around one half of net FDI flow over 25 years. (table 1.1)
The large influx of Japanese FDI in manufacturing sector happened in 1988, accounting for 72%
of net inflow of FDI and continued to rise year with few fluctuation.
Within the manufacturing sector, the important industries have changed over time. In the 1960s
and through most of 1970s, the Japanese FDI in manufacturing was concentrated in import-
substitution industries. The important industries invested were textiles, food, chemicals,
machinery & transport and electrical appliances. Most of the products were consumer goods to
serve the domestic market. But the Japanese firms heavily imported the capital equipment and
intermediate inputs to run their operation since local parts and components were not available or
may be unqualified. This led to the problem of trade deficit.
Therefore, in the early 1970s, the government began to provide more incentives to the export-
oriented investors. Some of Japanese firms such as those in textiles also turned from the domestic
market to a more export-oriented strategy. However, the response of the Japanese investors to the
new policy was not very promising.
Table 1.1
Share of Net Flows of Foreign Direct Investment from Japan Classified by Business
Unit: Percent
1971-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-95
Financial Institution 12.68 10.30 2.84 4.27 0.95
Trade 27.60 17.04 24.14 10.21 12.83
Construction 5.50 13.12 36.49 15.91 11.65
Mining & Quarrying O. 62 0.23 0.10 0.02 0.26
Oil Exploration 0.37 0.21 0.10 0.01 0.26
Others 0.25 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
Agriculture 0.97 -0.69 1.00 1.74 0.68
Industry 49.79 50.42 33.63 56.28 68.77
Food 11.05 4.26 -3.76 2.21 3.43
Textiles 22.85 29.04 7.56 0.06 0.54
Metal & Non metallic 2.01 1.07 12.93 8.81 9.87
Electric Appliances 4.45 1.96 9.46 28.99 29.42
Machinery & Transport 1.41 4.07 4.21 4.36 9.51
Chemical & Paper 7.05 6.74 2.74 4.44 6.28
Petroleum Products 0.01 0.56 0.03 -0.02 1.95
Construction Materials 0.62 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.06
Other Industry 0.33 0.73 0.35 6.37 5.72
Service 2.85 9.52 0.80 11.58 4.86
Transportation & Travel 1.67 8.54 1.01 0.98 1.37
Housing & Real Estate 0.51 0.36 0.00 2.85 0.26
Hotels & Restaurant 0.38 0.13 0.00 4.91 0.28
Others 0.29 0.50 0.78 2.83 2.95
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: International Affairs Division, BOI, August 1996
During the first half of 1980s, most of Japanese FDI were concentrated in construction,
accounting for 36.49% while manufacturing dropped to 33.63%. Japanese investment in the
manufacturing sector immensely flew after the Plaza Accord with the changing strategy. Japanese
investors invested mainly on the export-oriented products, capital goods and intermediate goods,
particularly in the machinery or engineering products. Electrical appliances have been the most
important industries up until now, followed by metal & non-metallic, machinery & transport and
chemical.(table 1.1)
"Japanese Direct Investment in Thailand" 83
During 1990-1995, the export-oriented projects from Japan were around 70% of the total projects
application and approvals whereas in term of volume of investment the share of export-oriented
projects fluctuated. But since 1995 the share of export-oriented projects has dropped to below
50%, mainly due to the relocation of Japanese investors to the lower-labor-cost location such as
China and Vietnam.
Chapter 2
Conceptual Framework
2.1 The Theoretical Development of FDI
Until around 1950 there was a well-developed formal theory of international trade but less well-
developed theory of capital movements. The first model to explain international production is the
theory of international capital movement which was developed over the ground of Hechscher-
Ohlin theory by Nurke and Iversen. This theory relaxed the assumption of no international
movement in productive factors in the H-O theory. Therefore, FDI is the result of capital flowing
from countries with low rate of return to countries with high rate of return. But this theory has two
theoretical defects. Firstly, factors of production do not consist of only capital so it could not
explain FDI which involves package transfer of capital, technology, marketing and management
know-how and so on. This theory can explain the flow of capital or the portfolio investment but
not FDI. Secondly, this theory is not able to explain the control aspect of FDI which is the main
differences between portfolio investment and FDI. 4
There are further development of theory of international economic involvement, comparing two
quite separate strands. The first concerns explanations of trade flows, being separated into two
main approaches. The first is that of the neofactor theories, which extend the two-factor
Hechscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model to embrace other location-specific endowments and
differences in quality of inputs, especially labor. The second is the neotechnology theories,
allowing the possibility of differences in the production function of enterprises and of imperfect
markets. The latter is different from the former because it focuses not on the specific resource
endowments of countries but on the exclusive possession of certain asset by enterprises. Both
theories explain that the commodity trade flows out of the country with location-specific
4 See Agrawal (1980), Lizondo (1991), Dunning (l992),UNCTC (1992) for the surveys of the literature on
theories and empirical studies of determinant of FDI.
endowments or fIrm-specifIc advantages into the other countries.
The second strand of research in the 1960s centered on explaining the growth and composition of
FDI while early explanations based on international capital movement theory were soon
abandoned for the above mentioned reasons. In the early 1960s, the explanation of FDI relied on
two main theories, which are the industrial organization theory, trying to answer the question
"why" or "how is it possible" international production and the location theory, trying to
answer "where" to make FDI.5
The industrial organization theory concentrates on identifying the characteristics of Transnational
Corporations (TNCs), that give them production or transactional advantages over other firms,
serving the same foreign markets. This theory was fIrst developed by Hymer who opened a whole
new research program in the area of FDI. The location theory tries to answer the question, "why
firms produce in one country rather than another." It concerns the characteristics of each
location which are attractive to the foreign investors. This approach was pioneered by Southard
and was tested intensively by survey and regression analysis over decades.
These two approaches were evolved independently of each other, therefore neither theory was
able to be wholly satisfactory. The former does not answer where the firm-specific advantages are
exploited while the latter does not explain how it is that foreign fIrms could not compete with
domestic firms in serving the markets. Moreover, neither theory attempted to explain the
dynamics of FDI. In this respect, the work of Vernon on the product life cycle theory, explains
the relationship between trade and investment as part of the same process of exploiting foreign
markets in a dynamic context. Besides answering the questions of "why" and "where" ,he
added "when" to the theory ofFDI.
Since the early 1970s, the development of the theories of international production has taken four
main directions.
1. Firstly, the industrial organization approach has been advanced extensively and has focused on
identifying and evaluating the "which" of advantages are most likely to explain patterns of
FDI.
2. Secondly, there have been a rise of financial aspects of the foreign activities of firms which can
5 John H. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Assison-Wesley Publisher
Ltd.,1992, pp. 4-6
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be classified into two groups as follows:
- first those which emphasize the imperfections of foreign exchange and capital markets.
- second those which extend portfolio theory to explain FDI by taking account of risk
diversification and stability of earnings.
3. Thirdly, the theory of firm and transaction cost are applied with the international production.
The basic proposition is that market failure in intermediate product markets and the need to
exploit the economies of interdependent activities lead firms to replace the external or market
transaction by internal transaction across countries. Hence, the internalization theory, has
emerged.
4. The last direction has been an attempt to synthesize the various theories into a general theory
of FDI. The most applicable theory is the eclectic theory, developed by Dunning.6
2.2 Review of literature on the Theories of FDI
In fact, there are many studies of the foreign direct investment. However, in this study, not all but
various and principal theories and empirical studies on FDI will be reviewed.
In this study, FDI refers to the investment made outside the home country of the investing
company. Full or partial control over the use of resources transferred remains with the investor.
These resources consist of a package of assets and intermediate products, such as capital,
technology, management skills, access to markets and entrepreneurship. The direct investor' s
purpose is to exert a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise in the
other economy. These investors mostly are the transnational corporation (TNC), or sometimes
called multinational corporation of multinational enterprise. In this study, a general definition of
the TNC is adopted, namely that it is an enterprise which has control over income generating
assets or productive activities in the country in which it is based. In this section, I will emphasize
the Catching-up Product Cycle Theory and the Eclectic Theory which was developed to explain
FDI for late-developed countries.
2.2.1 Product Life Cycle Theory
6 John H. Dunning, "Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the Multinational Enterprises: a Search
for an Eclectic Approach" , London: Routledge. 1993. pp.l83-188
Raymond Vernon (1966) is the pioneer on this theory which offers an explanation for both FDI
and international trade. Vernon' s work is concerned with: where new ideas and technology for
new products are likely to originate; where the production of new products is likely to begin; what
circumstances lead to the location of production abroad; where and what are the consequences for
the flow of FDI and for international trade. He answered these questions by introducing the
original model of product life cycle theory.?
In the original version, the life cycle of a product is divided into three stages as follows.
1. the new product stage, the maturing product stage and the standardized product stage. In the
fIrst stage when product is new, it is produced by the innovating fIrm in its home market such
as the United States, since there is the need for efficient coordination between research and
development and production units as well as the availability of demand for products there.
2. The second stage begins when the product is exported to the European countries having the
next higher level of income. Expansion of demand and growing competition in these markets
result in FDI of the innovating firms into these countries for local production in order to avoid
the loss of market shares and the product imitation.
3. The last stage is characterized by complete standardization of the product and production
process which is no longer an exclusive possession of the innovator. Price competition from
other producers forces him to invest into developing countries to seek cost advantages,
especially labor costs.
This theory is the first dynamic theory explaining why and where the TNCs undertakes FDI.
However, this original model has several problems. First, it can only explain the pattern of
American outward FDI but cannot explain the behavior of European and Japanese TNCs. Second,
it cannot explain the simultaneity of production of goods at the same stage in both home and host
country.
Therefore, in 1974 Vernon developed further the link between location of production,
multinationality and oligopolistic structures. This modified approach relies much on industrial
organization theory and put emphasis on the oligopolistic structure in which TNCs operate and
create barriers to entry. Vernon identifies three stages of oligopoly: the "innovation-based
7 Raymond Vernon. "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle"
Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 80. May 1966. pp. 190-207
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oligopoly" in which the innovator acquires barriers to entry due to the new technologies used in
either products or processes; the "mature oligopoly" in which the barriers to entry are
generated by scale in production, transportation and marketing; and the "senescent oligopoly"
such as cartels, and product differentiation.8 However, the second problem is still not resolved.
2.2.2 Catching-up Product Cycle Theory---Trade theory for the late-developers.
For nations that began their industrialization later than the United Kingdom, France, the United
States, Germany and Russia, the development of modern industry normally began with the import
of a new product from more advanced countries, followed by import-substituting production, and
finally progressed to production for export abroad. This sequence of industrial and trade
development was first presented by Kaname Akamatsu (1943) before the second world war. He
originally called it "the wild geese-flying pattern" (Ganko Keitai) of industrial development in
developing countries since the time-series curve for the development of each product suggesting,
according to Akamatsu, a pattern like "wild geese flying pattern in orderly ranks forming an
inverse 'V' ,just as airplanes fly in formation" .9
According to Yamazawa Ippei (1990), this pattern of development has been empirically
substantiated in many major manufacturing industries in Japan and has often been cited in studies
of Japan' s economics growth, including Kojima in 1958, Shinohara in 1962, Baba and Tatemoto
in 1968, and Yamazawa in 1972 and 1984. In 1973, Kojima renamed the pattern the catching-up
product cycle (CPC) after its association with the product cycle model of Vernon (1964). The new
name conveys more precisely the mechanism of industrial development that has been adopted in
this study, but the original name has remained popular. 10
Considering the main framework of the theory, three different scholars maintain different views
on the theory. Akamatsu, the originator of theory, suggested that the main framework was suitable
for the economic development in Japan. He understood the Japanese circumstances well that
Japan was a small country and lacked natural resources. Therefore, as a late developer, it was
important for Japan to import "technology" from the west and added it to the abundantly low
labor cost in order to create the significant competitive advantage for Japanese products.
8 Raymond Vernon. "The Location Activity" in Economics Analysis and the Multinational Enterprises.
George Allen & Unwill Ltd. 1974. pp. 91-109
9 Kaname Akamatsu. .. A Historical Pattern of economic Growth in Developing Countries" . The
Institute of Asian Economic Affairs. 1962.p.ll
10 Yamazawa Ippei. "Economic Development and International Trade---The Japanese Model. East-
West Center. Resource Systems Institute. Honolulu.l990. p.28
Although they are from the same academic institution (Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo), Kojima
Kiyoshi seemed not to agree with Akamatsu on the main framework of trade theory. In his
academic works, he emphasized on a new version of the principle of international division of
labor while Akamatsu emphasized on his "wild geese pattern" trade theory. Kojima seemed to
associate the dynamic of trade structural change with the foreign direct investments. The
Comparative Advantage theory was taken for granted in his works. By applying the principle of
international division of labor, he devoted his efforts in researching what he call "Japanese Type"
or "Trade-oriented" direct foreign investment. He argued in his famous Japanese Direct
Foreign Investment as follow:
"In many situations, host countries lack sufficient capital, technology or management resources to
realize the potential comparative advantage in international trade. Thus, foreign direct investment
is effective in supplementing these factors of production, thus making the industry internationally
competitive. Therefore, if direct foreign investment is undertaken along the line of comparative
advantage, it contributes harmoniously both to the steady industrialization and economic
development of the host country on the one hand, and, on the other, to a lower-cost foreign supply
for the investing country. Thus direct foreign investment works to compliment, instead of
substituting for, international trade, and both will bring prosperity of the international economy.
This is what I want to call 'Japanese Type'or 'trade-oriented' direct foreign investment." 11
Although Kojima's idea on trade pattern seemed to be similar to the Western theory, there is a
main difference in fundamental concept between his theory of international division of labor and
the classic theory, That is, Kojima did not take the trade framework as a static point of view. On
the contrary, he saw it as a base of trade and industrial development between host countries and
the investing country (Japan). It sounds like the big brother must commit to give away his
comparatively disadvantageous industries to the appropriate host, and concentrate on his
comparatively advantageous industries. In my opinion, this idea is totally different from the
classic theory in the sense of evolution through time series and the international cooperation
framework on industrial and trade development. I would like to discuss the concept again in the
next chapter on Foreign Direct Investment from Japan to Thailand. Here, I would like to introduce
and explore Kojima's ideas in his own words briefly as follow:
"What is the core of my analysis of 'Japanese-Type, trade-oriented' direct foreign investment?
The answer is simple. The comparative costs in Japan and the host country should be considered.
11 Kiyoshi Kojima. "Japanese Direct Foreign Investment---A Model of Multinational Business
Operations" . Tuttle, Tokyo. 1978, p.7
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Japan should undertake direct foreign investment in an industry becoming comparatively
disadvantageous in Japan which at the same time has the potential of becoming comparatively
advantageous in the host country. If an industry of the host country having potential comparative
advantage, is unable to achieve its comparative advantage with cheap costs as it lacks technology,
capital and management skill, if it were to become an industry of comparative advantage, it would
develop as a new export industry in the host country. In response to this, Japan should enlarge
another industry in which it has comparative advantage so that the capital and labor force of the
industry which undertook direct investment abroad are transferred to this promising industry. This
adjustment would upgrade the industrial structures of both Japan and the host country and could
increase harmonious trade between them. Direct foreign investment of this type would create a
more complimentary and a more profitable trade than if no foreign investment took place. This is
,Japanese-type, trade-oriented' direct foreign investment. 12
The most recent work on the Catching-up Product Cycle (CPe) theory was presented by
Yamazawa Ippei in 1990. Like Akamatsu, Yamazawa believed in the close association between
changes in the industrial structure and changes in the trade structure, each promoting one another
in the process of economic development. He described his observation on characteristics of
Japanese industrial development and international trade as follow:
With regard to the long-term trends in Japanese economics development and trade growth, the
following characteristics have been observed:
1. Rapid industrial growth lay at the core of Japan' s economic development and was
accomplished by an even greater expansion in exports and imports, reflecting Japan' s
resource endowment conditions.
2. The industrial growth process illustrates the CPC model of development, wherein several
modern industries introduced from abroad first achieved import substitution and later
developed into export industries. This can be considered a suitable development strategy for
later-developing countries.
3. As a result of CPC development in individual industries, remarkable structural changes in the·
economy took place in terms of the domestic output structure and the export and import
structures.
12 Ibid., p.l5
4. The sequencing of CPC development from light to heavy industries made possible the long-
term positive trend---that is, the accumulation of surpluses---in the trade balance, thereby
avoiding the balance of payments constraints in the latter stages of the development
" 13process
The point that makes me decide to implement his theory in this study is his main argument which
is different from Akamatsu's that the CPC model is not unique to Japan. Thus, according to
Yamazawa, the strategy adopted by the Japanese (as he called it Japan Model) may be regarded as
a suitable development strategy for newly industrializing economies today.
However, Yamazawa realized that the CPC needed some adaptation when applied to other newly
industrializing economies. He proposed two main variations which are the "Linkage to other
industries" and "The international transfer of CPC---Direct Foreign Investment, and
Technology Transfer" . Therefore, I would like to illustrate the CPC basic model and see whether
it can be applied to Thai cases.
The development of Textile Industry in Thailand can be traced as the original leading industry in
catching up (CPC) process. The other industries that followed are the office and household
machinery and appliances industry, the household electrical appliances industry, and at a
dramatically rapid rate of their catching up process is the footwear industry. However, there are
still some other industries which are preparing to take off, and even some other industries in the
declining period of the CPC process.
Non-ferrous Metal Industry, which is one types of mining industry gained a competitive
advantage even before the industrial promotion of the country. However, during the past years the
industry is in the declining period. The import has remained higher than the export since 1985.
Leather Product Industry which is very labor-intensive, has began to mature in 1985, and is
declining since then.
On the contrary, Motorcycles and radio and TV Industries are starting to catch up and is expected
to become important industries to replace the textile industry in the near future. The main growing
markets of both industries are Indochina and United States of America.
It is noted that the Automobile Industry is one of another group of industries where the catching
13 Yamazawa Ippei. "Economic Development and International Trade ---The Japanese Model" . East·
West Center. Resource Systems Institute. Honolulu. 1990. p.25
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up process seems to fail to work on. The main reason of the failure is said to be the non-
liberalization (which reflects in a great number of "big" infant industrial companies) of the
automobile trade during the past 30 years. In the early 1990s, the automobile industry is the most
important industry that induced the FDI from abroad, especially from Japan.
The failure in catching up of automobile industry, and of some important industries, apart from
the liberalization of the market, may lie on one of the effects of foreign direct investment towards
trade pattern. The only clear result from the analysis on the catching up process in Thailand is that
the "double track" catching up process does not seem to occur in Thai case. The figure 2.1
below illustrates the double track catching up process.
Figure 2.1 Akamatsu's Double Track Flying Geese Model
(2)
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Note : (1) = Import (2) = Production (3) = Export
Source : Kaname Akamatsu , A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing
Countries, in the Developing Economies, Tokyo, (The Institute of Asian Economic Affairs,
1962)
Although it can be concluded that CPC process can be used to explain the development of Thai
industrial and trade development during the past years to a certain extent, it is still questionable
whether the theory can be applied to include the development of capital goods industries.
Moreover, the expected result in trade deficit has not decreased as time passed. However, in
Thai' s case, the trade deficit was even worse during the past few years due to heavy importation
of capital goods and intermediate products.
Therefore, despite various clear evidences, it is still hard to conclude that Thailand follows
exactly the same pattern of the Japanese way of economic development. In my opinion, two of the
most obvious different points are as follow:
Firstly, as also discussed above, the skepticism that the production in Thailand, and its exports are
geared up by FDI from the other countries, especially that from Japan and the NIEs.
Secondly, another obvious point of difference between CPC model and Thailand' s way of
development, can be observed in the governmental activities, its attitude towards and, especially,
its role in initiating, and assisting economic development and growth. In short, the main
difference in philosophy of development is the influence of Buddhism' s of the "middle path"
ideology in Thailand.
I think that these two main factors affect the process in some industries, and on the other hand,
can be the key answers why CPC model cannot work in some Thai industries.
2.2.3 Eclectic Theory
The eclectic theory of FDI developed by Dunning is the most systematic and comprehensive
study on the theories of PDI. This theory has been called "eclectic" for three main reasons.
First, it draws on each of the main lines of explanation for multinational enterprise activity, which
have emerged over the past three decades. Second, it can explain all types of FDI. Lastly, it
covers the three main vehicles of foreign involvement, which are FDI, trade or export and
contractual resource transfers, e.g. licensing, technical assistance, management and franchising
agreement. This theory suggests which route of involvement by enterprises is likely to be
preferred.
The principal hypothesis on which the eclectic paradigm of international production is based is
that a firm will engage in PDI if and when three conditions are satisfied. 14 These are:
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1. It posses net ownership advantage via-a- via ftrms of other nationalities in serving particular
markets. These ownership advantages largely take the form of the possession of intangible
assets or of the advantages of common governance, which are, at least for a period of time,
exclusive or specific to the ftrm possessing them. These advantages originate from the ground
of industrial organization theory as discussed above.
2. Assuming condition 1 is satisfted, it must be more beneftcial to the enterprise possessing these
advantages to use them (or their output) by itself rather than to sell or lease them to foreign
ftrms. These advantages are called internalization advantages. These advantages have already
been explained in the section of internationalization theory.
3. Assuming condition 1 and 2 are satisfied, it must be in the global interests of the enterprise to
utilize these advantages in conjunction with at least some factor inputs (including natural
resource) outside its home country; otherwise foreign markets would be served entirely by
exports and domestic markets by domestic production. These advantages are termed the
location advantage of countries. The descriptions of location of location-specific advantages
are discussed in the location theory.
The above conditions can explain all forms of international production, comprising FDI, trade and
contractual resource transfers. In the case of each type, the possession of ownership advantages is
a necessary prerequisite of foreign involvement. But due to the internalization advantages the
enterprises will exploit ownership advantages by way of exports or FDI rather than by contractual
resource exchanges; whereas the FDI preferred to exports will be chosen where location
advantages favor a foreign rather than a domestic production base. Table 2.1 summarizes the
conditions to make choices.
14 John H. Dunning. "Trade location of Economic Activity and the Multinational Enterprises: a Search
for an eclectic Approach" . London,Routledge. 1993, pp.l96-197
Table 2.1 Alternative routes of servicing markets
Advantages
Route of servicing markets (Foreign)
Ownership International Location
FDI Yes Yes Yes
Trade in goods and services Yes Yes No
Contractual resource transfers Yes No No
Source: Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the Multinational Enterprise:
A Search for the Eclectic Approach. John H. Dunning (1993), pp.199
This theory is still popular in the present study of FOI. However, there are some doubts on this
study. Some have mentioned that the eclectic theory itself is not a theory but the "framework"
of theories. IS
2.3 Special Characteristics of Japanese Direct Investment (JDI)
Quite different from the conceptual framework on foreign direct investment discussed in section
2.2, the academic and empirical researches on FOI started very recently in the first half of 1970.
Most of the early theories try to find out the justifications of behavior of the US and other
Western transnational corporations, their objectives, reasons of investment, approach of
management, etc. The research on Japanese Oirect investment (JOI) was perceived as a special
case or as a Western follower. The serious analysis on JOI was firstly done and presented by
Kiyoshi Kojima in 1978.
In this section the major theories advanced by Western economists to explain the behavior of
Western multinationals are briefly reviewed, and their relevance as applied to the behavior of
Japanese multinational is reviewed and emphasized with the necessary theoretical modifications.
One of the most well-known Western framework of direct investment is the "Industrial
Organization" approach which can be used to explain the pattern of "horizontal" foreign
15 Suvinai Pornnavalai, "Theory of Transnational Corporation and the Development of Thai
Economy" , Thammat University Publishing, 1992, pp.l51 (in Thai)
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investment. Stephen H. Hymer, Charles P. Kindleberger and Richard E. Caves, among others,
emphasized that direct investment occurs in industries characterized by oligopolistic market
structures in both home and host countries. By definition, oligopolistic market structures is
composed of individual firms which enjoys monopolistic profits through possessing and
controlling some type of firm-specific, rent yielding attributes, like a superior technology or
greater knowledge about production, marketing and management. Therefore, one of the main
reasons of investing overseas is to protect any possible loss on, and at the same time, to gain any
possible benefits from the advantages. Together with the unfamiliarity with local market
conditions, the foreign direct investment is highly valued as the most suitable approach to expand
the firm's operation abroad.
According to this view, there would be no direct foreign investment in a perfectly competitive
market because in the perfectly competitive market, the investing firm cannot retain its
advantages, nor differentiate itself from other local firms. Kindleberger has pointed out that there
ought to be some type of "market imperfections" in the market for direct foreign investment to
take place. 16
Thus the approach expects the direct investment to be concentrated on the industries which,
according to their nature, contain some imperfection originated in production (technology),
market (powerful information analysis capability) or by any interference in competition by
government or by firms. It is not difficult to observe that the heavy concentration of the Western
investment in Thailand is according to this theoretical framework. The investment of big
transnational firms like IBM, Shell, Nestle, etc are good examples of this approach.
Nevertheless, a majority of Japanese investment in Thailand in manufacturing composes of the
investment of small and medium-size companies, produce mostly standardized, low-technology
products, which is quite contrary to the expectation of this approach.
Another interesting development in the industrial organization approach was recently emphasized
by John K. Galbraith. His approach supplements the Hymer-Kindleberger-Caves model17. That is,
he also interprets direct investment as a market behavior, predetermined by the oligopolistic
structure of industry rather than molded by any internal psychological drive of the individual
16 Robert Z. Aliber. .. A Theory of Direct Foreign Investment" . in The International Corporation.ed
Charles P. Kindleberger, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1970, pp. 17-34
17 Caves, Richard E., "International corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment"
in Economica, vol. 38 (February), p. 12
firms. This type of analysis is largely in line with the neoclassical economic approach that
identifies a firm's behavior with the particular type of market structure in which it operates.
Galbraith interprets overseas investment essentially as the rational behavior of big oligopolistic
corporations in advanced capitalist economy. In mature stage of capitalism what he calls "a
technostructure" comes into existence. The technostructure is "a complex of scientists,
engineers, and technicians" in the field of management, marketing, and production, hired by big
corporation. It is a planning system built on "collective intelligence" and on "the authority of
organization" . According to Galbraith, the main behavior of this modem efficiency-oriented
business organization is that it strives to eliminate uncertainties in the market, first at home and
then overseas, as its span ofoperation expands. However, the existence of an oligopolistic market
is simply a necessary but not a sufficient condition for direct investment to occur. The firms in
such a market must reach a mature stage of organization to form a technostructure.
Several Japanese corporations have already grown to form a technostructure in Galbraith's sense.
In Thailand, one can easily list Japanese large corporations --- Toyota, Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Sony etc. as technostructures because they qualify the defmition described above.
It is quite clear that Galbraith's approach describes the aggressive behavior of the big, mature
transnational companies. In a quite different perspective, Vernon saw the direct investment as a
defensive approach of the investing firms. In his product cycle approach, which is the first
approach that associates direct investment with trade, he emphasized the rapid succession of new
products, some even developed into new industries. According to his approach, new innovations
are invented in the US, quickly spread to the other industrial economies, and finally, to the
developing countries. As a result, world trade in new products has flourished, but with shifting
patterns of comparative advantage as innovations spread from one industrial center to another.
This dynamic trade pattern is captured in the so-called product cycle theory of trade.
This theory postulates that new products or processes are likely to be first introduced in a
developed country like the US that enjoys the advantages of a large affluent market with the
world' s highest standard of living, and a relatively abundant supply of technological and
entrepreneurial resources. Thus the US firm that innovates a new product can exploit its
monopolistic position first at home and then in the markets of other industrialized countries with
similar demand structures. But when the market for the product develops overseas as a result of
the very success of the firm' s exporting, and as the technology to produce the new product is
perfected and standardized, firms in other industrialized countries are motivated first to produce
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for their own markets and later even for export. They enjoy a variety of local advantages,
including their familiarity with the local markets and lower labor costs, which are a predominant
cost factor in the mature stage of product cycle. These foreign producers may eventually succeed
in exporting the product back to the US. 18
Since new products or processes are bound to be limited by and produce in other countries,
innovating firms may decide to move into foreign markets themselves in order to retain control of
new products by establishing their own production facilities, either wholly-or jointly-owned.
This Product Cycle Approach was different from Japanese investment in two main senses. First,
unlike the Catching-up Product Cycle Approach which is fully described above, this model
cannot directly apply to the Japanese manufacturing ventures overseas because Japanese are the
followers rather than the innovators of the new products. Second, the effect of this approach is
that as the investment expands to other countries, the trade is likely to be replaced.
Kiyoshi Kojima (1978) argued against this approach and called American type of investment as
"anti-trade-oriented" while he defined the Japanese type as "trade-oriented" type of
investment. I9
As also described above, according to Kojima, American overseas manufacturing investments are
designed mostly to produce highly sophisticated, technology-based products for local markets. In
contrast, Japanese investments are in low-technology, standardized products aiming both to
satisfy the local markets and exportation with the main assumption that the smaller the
technological difference between the investing and host country industry is, the easier it is to
transfer and improve the technology of latter. This assumption has been implied, even in the
speech of y. Ojimi20, vice minister of international trade of industry as follows:
"Because of technological exchanges between advanced nations in the 70s, there will be an
equalization of levels of technology, and the industrial structures of these nations will become
increasingly homogenous. Also, industrialization in developing countries will stimulate
competitive relations in the markets of advanced nations in products with a low degree of
18 Raymond Vernon, "International Investment and International Trade in The Product Cycle" ,
Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 80, May 1966, pp.l90-207
19 Kiyoshi Kojima, Japanese Direct Foreign Investment--- A Model of International Business
Operations, Tuttle, Tokyo, 1978, p. 20
20 Y. Ojimi, Basic Philosophy and objectives of Japanese Industrial Policy, in The Industrial Policy of
Japan, OCED, Paris, 1972, pp.l4-15
processing. As a result, the confrontation between trade protectionism and free trade will become
more intense."
"The solution of this problem is to be found, according to economic logic, in progressively giving
away industries to other countries, much as big brother gives his out-grown clothes to his younger
brother. In this way, a country's own industries become more sophisticated."
In this sense, it can be seen that Japan is more apt to undergo an internal structural adjustment
than the US, because Japan' s industrial policy emphasizes on the whole, protecting high -
technology, high-growth sectors, while the rising protectionism in the US is forcing itself to
protect low-technology, low-growth sectors. Hence, a greater incentive exists for Japan' s low-
growth sectors to go overseas than for her high-growth sectors. It can be seen that this
phenomenon is associated with Japanese industrial transformation.
In his theory, Kojima explained that the core of his analysis lies in the comparative cost in Japan
and the host country. He argued that Japan should undertake direct foreign investment in an
industry becoming comparatively disadvantageous in Japan which at the same time has the
potential of becoming comparatively advantageous in the host country?]
Kojima postulated that Japanese FOI has been trade oriented while American FOI has been anti-
trade oriented. This was reflected from the fact that Japanese FOI was mainly directed toward
development resources in which Japan has a comparative disadvantage, and toward some
manufacturing sectors, mostly labor-intensive industries, in which Japan had been losing her
comparative advantage. Moreover, Japanese investors involve in export-oriented industries in
developing countries. Hence, Japanese FOI improves international trade and welfare.
However, these explanation for Japanese direct investment may describe the outflow of capital
from Japan in the 1950s and early 1960s fairly well. But in the late 1960s, the motivation of FOI
from Japan began to change.
Over the years, Japanese investors turn to invest in the industries in which they have comparative
advantage in terms of technological know-how, marketing or managerial skills as compared to
host countries. The trend of characteristics of Japanese FOI has approached to the anti-trade-
oriented FOI. Their FOI was induced by a desire to take advantage of accumulated technological
21 ]. Saul Lizondo, "Foreign Direct Investment" , in Determinants and Systemic Consequences of
International Capital Flows, International Monetary Fund,l991. pp.79
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know-how and of innovative products. The Japanese investors tend to exploit their oligopolistic
advantages directly in the host countries like the American investors. Hence, the explanatory
power of Kojima's hypothesis is still doubtful.
Although, there are numerous theories trying to explain Japanese FDI, neither can be applied to
all kind of FDI. Some can explain only the FDI in short run or can explain only partial analysis.
Therefore, in the next section, I would like to analyze the relationship between Japanese direct
investment and its impact on Thailand's foreign trade pattern.
Chapter 3
The role of Japanese FDI on Thailand's economic development
3.1 The Role of FDI in Economic Development
There are many lessons for development in the theory of foreign investment. What the theory
includes is that ideas have the potential to be as important as monetary allocations. An economy
can grow, just because new ideas generate innovation. International trade, foreign investment and
the multinational corporations can be looked at as means of transferring of goods and services
and, most importantly, ideas. For a developing country, new ideas arrive, because of efforts to
make investments profitable. Further transfers of ideas occur due to incentives that encourage
them in the market. In this sense, the problem faced by a developing country is not that different
from that of an advanced economies. In these new ideas arrive because of international efforts to
promote production and are received because of international efforts to help make this possible.
The central question is then what resulting "spillover effect" does FDI have on growth? By
spillover effect it is meant to what degree does FDI effect the economy beyond the gain in fixed
assets and currency. It has become recognized that industries that have been recipients of FDI
have higher levels of technological progress. Ideas supersede industries as an idea in one industry
may bring about an application in some other industry. If this continues to demonstrate such
positive result, taxing the corporation may become viewed as an action detrimental to
development.22
22 Calder. Kent, "Recent Trends in FDI for Developing World" in International Monetary Fund, March
1992. pp. 12-15
3.2 The effect of FDI on the Host Economy
Along with the diffusion of ideas, more advantages of FDI are the entrepreneurial skills brought
with the knowledge of experience. The most prudent, and least hazardous way of going about
most things is in fmding an expert guide to follow. New knowledge is the most important benefit
of the international exchange of goods and services, and relations with outsiders is tremendously
needed. Technological progress take place because innovators find profitable new ways of doing
things. New product development and utilization contributes to aggregate human knowledge,
Thereupon reducing the cost of innovation?3
Technology precedes accumulated human knowledge, progressing in variable intervals. Income
growth has always shown itself to be faster among countries that have a relatively large educated
population and an economy which is supportive for accumulation of human development.
Obvious and immediate effects of FDI are as well not to be ignored. Foreign investment raises
wages, provides employment, increases land value, and raises the long-term fixed asset value in
host countries. It is an important means to expand exports. FDI can assist in lowering the cost of
innovation. FDI is in essence the following deal made by the host country to the investing entity:
"we will allow you to profit from using your ideas in our market and we hope to profit from the
spillover-effect. However, in reality it is not as simple as this. A host country cannot afford to
take a passive role, for inaction translates into dependency" .
FDI consists of not only capital, but technology and market access. Other forms of investment
such as loans and credits are often tied to other conditions. Repayment only comes if productive
activity is profit making, and repayment can be managed through tax policies and regulations.
The FDI has a deep influence on the economic development of host economies. Controversy over
this has subsided greatly in recent years. FDI does not have the adverse effects once associated
with it. The benefits of FDI are greatest in a relatively free and market-oriented system, and
certainly dependent upon private economic decisions from straying far from social good.
The impact of FDI has already been proven in Thailand. Thailand is a country short of capital, but
able to offer much to those with capital. Naturally a dual bond forms. However, to believe that
Thailand is going to skip industrialization to be a post modern country in the near future.
23 Cantwell, J., "Technological Innovation and Multinational Corporations" , Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1989, p 18
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3.3 Japanese FDI and it's effect on Thailand's industrial and trade structural
Japanese FDI is one of the most important factors which boost Thailand's economy. The net
inflow of Japanese FDI can be divided into 3 waves.
1. The first wave began in the 1970s and concentrated on the import-substitution industries,
most of which are labor-intensive products and consumer goods to serve the domestic
market.
2. The next wave started in the mid-1980s, particularly after the Plaza Accord. During this
period, Japanese investors immensely invested on the export-oriented products, capital and
intermediate goods.
3. The last wave began in mid-1993. Most of Japanese firms coming to Thailand are small and
medium-sized companies in the supporting industries. They have been encouraged by the
manufacturers in Thailand to locate production bases in Thailand in order to serve directly
parts and components for these existing firms.
The pattern of Japanese FDI has changed over time. And it is quite interesting to understand the
reasons as to why Japanese investors decide to invest in Thailand. The main determinants are the
economic growth of Thailand, trade barriers imposed by the government of Thailand and political
instability in Thailand. And the real exchange rate (Baht/Yen) is found to have effects on the real
Japanese inflows (table 3.1). This means that the depreciation of the Baht against Japanese Yen
would stimulate the Japanese FDI.
Thus, after the economic crisis in 1997 the Thai Baht was devalued lower than 25 Baht per US
dollar, the impact of Baht devaluation was quite strong to the FDI. 24 The devaluation also
associates with hardships for importing raw materials as well as holding debts denominated in
foreign currencies.
24 Bank of Thailand. Monthly Bulletin. October 1998
Table 3.1 The real exchange rate (BahtlYen)
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000p
Real Exchange
Rate 21.64 24.31 24.58 25.08 24.60 22.69
(Bathl1OOYen)
Source: The International Financial Statistics Year Book of the International
Monetary and Fund, July 2000
In addition, according to the Product Life Cycle Theory, the Japanese investors prefer to invest in
Thailand owing to the relative factor cost advantage of Thailand. The outcome indicates that the
net Japanese FOI is affected by the relative user cost of capital of Thailand and Japan significant,
which may be explained by the following reasons. First, the effect of relative efficiency wage
might have been included in the real exchange rate. In addition, this variable might be
inappropriate because it takes both effects of wage and productivity into account.
Apart from these, the lagging Japanese capital stock is another factor that encourages the Japanese
FOI for several reasons. Firstly, the existing Japanese firms may expand or improve their
production process in order to serve the growing market of Thailand. Secondly, the competing
Japanese firms in supporting industries are induced to invest in Thailand to supply the part and
components to the existing Japanese manufacturers in Thailand.
3.3.1 The intricate relationship between trade structure and industrial structure
In order to analyze the development of international trade in Thailand, in this study I would like
to assume that the foreign trade pattern of Thailand is also affected by the government policies
and its role of the Japanese FOI on the industrial and trade development.
The trade structural development in Thailand in 1986 is partly induced by government' s
economic development policy. For example, Department of Export Promotion was set up to
assimilate trade information as well as to provide technical and fmancial supports to both new and
current exporters. Various industrial parks and export processing zone projects were carried out to
help both importers and exporters who basically aim to boost up the manufactured exports figure.
The industrial development in Thailand was introduced through the export promotion policy. The
main instruments were control on trade through product diversification and technological
incremental strategies.
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Over the period 1990-1995, Exports was climbing, investment was on the rise and international
reverse was record of $ 125 billion?5 Indeed, the biggest problem the economy faces in the short
term is that it may growing too fast.
Therefore, the trade boom during the period of 1985-95 in Thailand was probably the domestic
industrial structural change from agro-industries to emphasize on light manufacturing industries.
It is important; therefore, to discuss of change of industrial structure along the trade structure
development and economic development process of the country.
Nonetheless, the undeniable fact is that international trade becomes more important for Thai
economy. Also from the table 3.2, it confirms once again that international trade plays important
role in economic development of the country. In 1985-88, the total of export demand and import
substitution, in which the minus figure means import increases in respond to economic growth,
represents for more than 68% of the all production activities of the country. It is quite clear that
strong domestic demand and strong export demand help accelerate the development process
during the past years.
Table 3.2 Growth of Manufacturing output 1975-95 (%)
1975-80 1980-85 1985-1990 1990-1995
Domestic 79.5 72.2 74.0 78.1
demand
Import -7.7 ·7.4 '7.0 ·23.4
Substitution
Export demand 28.2 35.2 49.8 45.3
Source: World Bank: Thailand
Adjustment" ,1996, Table 7.4
"Managing Public Resource for Structural
From the same table, another fact can also be observed. That is, Thailand is moving away from
import substitution policy and involving more in export promotion policy. In my opinion, this
structural change, together with structural change in trade, can be explained, to a certain extent,·
by Yamazawa' s theory of trade and industrial development, or what is originally presented by
Akamatsu as "Flying wild geese" pattern of development. The sudden increase in the export
25 Department of Statistics of Thailand Report. Office of the Prime Minister. October 1997
demand also implies that the development of foreign trade in Thailand has been closely related to
its process of industrialization.
As I argue that the change in trade structure In Thailand is intricately relate to the industrial
change of the country, it is important to further trace the historical events on the industrial
development and change in Thailand. It is important to note that while Japanese government
preferred a closed development strategy with strictly regulated foreign investment and strictly
supervised import of technology in respect to its content, the ideology of industrial policy in
Thailand is learning towards the open system. However, the free flow of foreign investment, as
contrast to the Japanese case,were promoted to help the trade protection.26
Out of those policies the most influential effect on the development of trade pattern of Thailand is
the recent policy on regional trade cooperation--- the AFTA. Department of Business Commerce
of Thailand forecasted at the beginning of 1996, that the most important export market of Thai
products would change from the US and Japan to ASEAN. We can see that the major effect of
regional trade cooperation is the concentration of trade within the group. This is totally against the
assumption of perfect competition argued above.
The most important policy of AFTA is the agreement on the planning of tariff reduction. At the
beginning, it was decided that AFTA be implemented within 15 years from January 1, 1993.
The tariff reduction framework will surely affect the foreign trade pattern of Thailand in various
ways. And the regional tariff protection imposed by the government of Thailand is the most
important for Japanese FDI in both long run and short run. However, this policy is not suitable in
the recent trend of world economic forum, in which the government is induced to adopt the trade
liberalization policy.
The another policy should be adopt to encourage Japanese FDI by considering the next major
factors. In long run, the study points out that the real exchange rate of Thai Baht against Japanese
Yen is another determinant of Japanese FDI. Since the depreciation of Baht against Yen could
stimulate Japanese FDI, the exchange rate policy can be managed by the government to attract
them.
Besides, in the short run, it is found that the relative efficiency wages is the next important
26 Regarding the meaning of "Industrial Policy" . I applied Kojima's meaning as above.
Ryutaro Kojima. "Industrial Policy of Japan. Academic Press Tokyo.l988. p.4
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determinant, following the tariff barriers. Therefore, in order to induce Japanese FDI inflow to the
Thai economy in short run, we have to retain these competitiveness. However, it is not reasonable
to reduce the nominal wage but we should increase the productivities of Thai labor in order to
reduce the relative wage share of value of produced output of Thailand and Japan. Hence, the
government has to subsidize education and training in order to increase the quality and quantity of
skilled labors, engineers, and scientists.
The factors, which affect the Japanese FDI both in short run and long run, include the political
instability, the relative user cost of capital of Thailand and Japan and the economic growth of
Thailand. As a reSUlt, to motivate the Japanese investors to invest in Thailand, the government
should be aware of government political image and policy issuing.
Apart from these, under the investment promotion policy, the government should give more or
special investment incentives or privileges to projects that require fewer imports, generate export
and play a role to encourage other firms to invest in Thailand such as those in the supporting
industries.
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